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It is a notorious fact that one of the pressure points emerging when the common law and 
the civil law are set against each other lies in their differing attitudes to the notion of 
good faith. This was a matter of some significance during the evolution of the CISG. 
Good faith is such a corner stone of civilian thinking, along with the dependence of the 
civil law upon so-called general clauses, that its absence from the core of common law 
thinking gives rise to a pressing need for the common law attitude to be explained, as 
though the common law were placed on the back foot. Consequently, and also because 
the majority of legal systems are civilian in nature, I shall start with an explanation of the 
common law attitude towards good faith, taking my own law, English law, as the point of 
departure. 
 
The issue of good faith is sometimes presented as though it measured the ethical content 
of a legal system. Approaching it from that angle, a requirement of good faith conduct in 
the law of contract could be seen as a defining feature of legal systems in the romano-
canonical tradition, whereas its absence in legal systems belonging to the common law 
tradition could be seen as a measure of the materialistic character of that tradition. That is 
a crude dichotomy, of course, and it invites demolition. Indeed, one might say that it has 
been set up for the purpose of being demolished.  
 
Before considering the presence of good faith in the common law tradition, it is necessary 
to have a sense of what we mean by good faith. It is striking to see how frequent this 
elementary point is avoided in discussions about the rights and wrongs of importing good 
faith. At one end of a graduated scale, good faith amounts to honesty. At the other end, it 
amounts to paying proper regard to the interests of the other contracting party perhaps 
even at the expense of one’s own practical interests. In the American Restatement Second 
of Contract, good faith appears as good faith and fair dealing,1 which arguably stops short 
of paying regard to the interests of others and certainly does not require the sacrifice of 
self-interest for the benefit of the other contracting party.  
 
 
2. The Common Law Attitude 
 
(a) ethical conduct and the common law 
 
Is it true to say that the common law in general turns its back on any need for ethical 
conduct? The following two examples clearly deny this. The first example concerns 
equitable discretionary remedies, such as injunctions and specific performance, which 
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may be withheld from someone who does not come to court with “clean hands”.2 A 
second example of the ethical conduct of a litigant being subjected to close scrutiny 
concerns those relationships where one party’s interests are subordinated to those of 
another. We call these fiduciary relationships and, broadly, they arise where one party 
reposes trust and confidence in another and that other undertakes to act in the interests of 
the confiding party.3 Fiduciary relationships are usually nominate instances, such as 
trustee and beneficiary, or principal and agent, but they can also arise in an innominate 
way where the circumstances of a particular relationship in fact justify it.4 Fiduciary 
relationships are most unlikely to arise in sale transactions. Indeed, sale is the 
paradigmatic arm’s length transaction. There are numerous other examples that could be 
given that will not be investigated here but mention might be made of contracts of the 
utmost good faith, notably insurance contracts, which require full and candid disclosure 
on the part of the insured. It is tempting to see their recognition as ethically inspired but a 
better explanation may be that full disclosure is a necessary means for the insurer to 
measure the risk and to maintain a sufficient fund to meet demands upon it by other 
insureds. 
 
(b) abstraction and legal rules 
 
A profound difference between the common law and civil law exists in the way that legal 
rules are conceived. The two systems pitch legal rules at different levels of abstraction, 
with the civil law taking the more abstract approach. This is not unrelated to the different 
way in which the two legal traditions draw the line between questions of law and 
questions of fact.5 It is hard to imagine a French court at the level of a cour d’appel or 
upwards devoting anything like the same attention to principles and rules of damages 
assessment as is paid to them by their common law equivalents in England. Again, the 
many rules of law dealing with the formation of a contract in English law can be 
contrasted with an observation contained in the notes to Article 1101 of the Code civil 
dealing with contractual formation,6 that it is a matter for the “pouvoir souverain des 
juges du fond” to determine the will of the parties.  
 
In so far as good faith is concerned, English law does not have the same taste as certain 
civil law systems for expressly recognising a principle of good faith in contract law 
(however that might be defined). It is, however, able by virtue of more detailed rules to 
achieve many of the same results. In the process, English law resists the temptation to 
gather those rules together in the form of a broader rule that would summarise them and 
would aspire to add some predictive measure of how problems, whose resolution is not 
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explicitly provided for, may be disposed of in the future. The codifying impulse in 
English law, apart from a surge in the late 19th century and a temporary flirtation with 
codification on the part of the Law Commission in the 1960s, has never been strong. 
English courts have also been resistant to the temptation to overgeneralise, and have at 
times criticised a tendency for their judgments to be interpreted as if they were the words 
of a statute. The preference has on the whole been to leave matters that have not received 
full argument to be dealt with on another day. 
 
(c) commercial certainty 
 
The common law sets great store by commercial certainty. Even Lord Mansfield, the 
great 18th century judge whose writings display a deep learning in and appreciation of 
the civil law, set great store by certainty: “In all mercantile contracts the great object 
should be certainty. And therefore, it is of more consequence that a rule should be certain, 
than whether it is established one way or the other. Because speculators in trade then 
know what ground to go upon.”7 Note the absence of any reference to fairness or justice. 
Certainty, however, is not a value that is promoted relentlessly For example, a 
fundamental clash has been observed in recent years between the compensatory principle 
in contract damages cases and the so-called “desideratum” that damages should be set in 
such a way as to provide certainty even if this approach did not provide accurate 
compensation. The clash occurred in a case where, according to the minority view, 
damages for future losses after the termination of a contract for breach should, in the 
interests of certainty, not take account of an event that subsequently happened and that 
demonstrated the claimant’s loss to be less than it appeared it would be at the date of 
termination. The majority view was that accurate compensation trumped certainty so that 
the subsequent event should be taken into account.8 The conventional view is that 
certainty encourages investment in and commitment to contractual ventures. For 
example, a rule that requires a documentary presentation to be closely or exactly 
compliant with the demands of a documentary letter of credit is designed to do this, 
though whether it fulfils the design in practice, given that the majority of documentary 
presentations in fact made are in one or more particular non-compliant, is perhaps a moot 
point. 
 
Contract is increasingly an agglomeration of standard forms, not all of which are 
generated by one of the contracting parties and imposed on the other. To the extent that a 
clear meaning can be ascribed to a well-established term, and that a judicial interpretation 
of this term acquires a binding authority for future occasions, then the cause of certainty 
is advanced. Certainty would not be advanced if the motives of the party relying upon the 
clause could be questioned so as to determine whether a clause might be invoked in that 
party’s favour. So far as the process of contractual interpretation is treated as a matter of 
law, then judicial decisions can be attached to the principle of binding judicial authority. 
Once interpretation strays from the written word to the background circumstances of the 
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contract, which has happened in England within the last twenty years or so, then certainty 
is compromised.9 
 
Certainty is also compromised by the introduction of judicial discretion, whether as a 
feature of the common law or as a matter of legislation, as has occurred in the matter of 
unfair contract terms regulation.10 In this instance, the notion of reasonableness with 
some legislative guidelines has been given an extensive role, though it should be noted 
that the increasing separation of consumer and commercial transactions has led to a 
marked judicial reluctance to treat exemption and related clauses as unreasonable in 
commercial cases. In a similar way, the old prohibition against penalty clauses has been 
revised so that, as between arm’s length commercial parties, they will be allowed to stand 
if a legitimate commercial objective is being pursued in a proportionate manner.11 Apart 
from this, it is an entirely legitimate question to ask how and to what extent a regulatory 
criterion of reasonableness differs from a requirement of good faith, and whether much of 
the disagreement between common law and civil law mentalities is a matter of semantic 
style. One response is to say that the difference is not easily measurable but that 
reasonableness is legislatively sanctioned to work only within a particular sector of 
contractual activity, whereas the civilian principle of good faith is given full rein.12 
 
(d) commodities markets 
 
The commodities markets are notoriously volatile, some, such as oil, being more volatile 
than others. They can reel under the shock of regional wars, global financial crises and 
even a slowdown in one of the world’s major economies. Volatility spells risk and risk 
gives rise to a practical need to hedge against risk and to a need also for dynamic markets 
in which entry on the part of speculators is needed to encourage price stability. The 
reliability of contract as a risk-controlling mechanism is almost too obvious to be stated, 
and contract can hardly be a reliable mechanism if it does not give rise to ex ante 
certainty. It is not just the markets in the commodities themselves, whether they concern 
grain, metals or oil, that are volatile; the related freight markets are highly sensitive to 
price movements in commodities, such sensitivity also extending to the shipbuilding 
market.13  
 
Contracts of this nature have exercised a very substantial influence on the development of 
English contract law from at least the second half of the 19th century. Indeed, it is 
arguable that they have distorted the character of English law by crowding out cases of a 
more domestic character. Litigation is fuelled by money and, as intricate and interesting a 
consumer dispute or other minor matter may be, in a country where the costs of litigation 
are high it is the big money cases that by and large get to court and drive the development 
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of the law. A striking feature of English case law, contrasting significantly with a country 
like France, is just how few cases arrive before the higher courts, namely, the (single) 
Court of Appeal (for England and Wales) and the Supreme Court. 
 
The influence played by the big money cases in the development of English law is 
complemented by the judicial concern for the importance of finance-related activity in the 
British economy. The City of London is not just a leading centre for finance; it plays also 
a key role in legal and insurance services and in commodities trading. Popular references 
may be made, for example, to the Rotterdam spot market, but the most important places 
for trading in oil are London, New York and Singapore.14 The importance of these 
ancillary services for the British economy is reflected also in the development of the 
Commercial Court, the recent setting up of a Financial List,15 and the encouragement 
given to arbitration by granting only a minimal supervisory role to the courts.16 It is 
evident too in the activities of the Financial Markets Law Committee, originally 
established under the aegis of the Bank of England but now a free-standing and 
influential body that draws attention to developments that threaten certainty in the 
financial markets.17 
 
A characteristic feature of commodities contracts is the preference they express for 
English law and the antipathy they show to uniform law, such as the CISG. GAFTA (the 
Grain and Feed Trade Association) accounts for 80 per cent of the world’s international 
physical trade in agricultural commodities, providing for the application of English law 
and for the exclusion of the CISG.18 It might be said that this is, in the jargon of the social 
sciences an example of path dependency, and due to the historical origins of GAFTA in 
the Liverpool Corn Trade Association, but this explanation is inadequate for at least two 
reasons. The preference for English law is expressed also by non-UK based entities. 
Total, for example, is a French oil company. Its standard form contracts for crude oil on 
CIF and FOB terms both provide for the application of English law and for the exclusion 
of the CISG. Furthermore, the integration of a long-used trading form in a legal system 
cannot be over-estimated. The famous GAFTA 100 contract is the descendant of form 
number 1 of the Liverpool Corn Trading Association, dating from the late 19th century. 
This form, like similar forms, has been developed in concert with the actions of the 
English courts so as to achieve a state of symbiosis. The continuing preference of the 
form (and of the traders it represents) for English law and for the exclusion of the CISG 
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cannot be put down to the legal equivalent of what Marxists call false consciousness, as 
though they could be brought round to the virtues of adopting the CISG if only they could 
observe it in the right conditions, whistling at the same time the Ode to Joy from 
Beethoven’s Choral Symphony. 
 
The commodities cases are replete with examples of what might be called bad faith 
conduct that goes unpunished. Thus a buyer of March shipment goods on CIF terms can 
terminate the contract for shipment out of time even though the buyer’s only reason for 
doing so is a fall in the rice market;19 the FOB seller of Australian barley, who has gone 
short and does not have a cargo available to fulfil the contract, can lawfully object to the 
buyer’s nomination of a vessel that can load the cargo only in some and not all of the 
deepwater ports of South Australia and Victoria, even though the monopoly exporter20 is 
willing to provide a cargo for the nominated vessel at some of those ports;21 and the FOB 
seller of feed barley can refuse to allow the buyer to substitute a perfectly suitable vessel 
for the one already nominated and now prevented by maritime casualty from arriving in 
time in the loading port.22 And many more examples could be cited. When contract law 
and standard forms allow such actions to be taken, the courts may draw breath through 
bared teeth but they will not sacrifice certainty on the altar of justice in the individual 
case.23 In a real sense, the disciplining of traders who take sharp, meritless points is left to 
the market itself. There are relatively few traders; they know each other very well; and 
they are perfectly able and willing to reciprocate at a later date. 
 
(e) contractual interpretation and the matrix 
 
Some contracts involve significant forward planning, complex drafting, negotiation and 
give-and-take. Others do not. Commodities contracts are usually concluded informally 
and at speed on standard forms, with courts unwilling to take liberties with the wording 
of standard forms,24 especially if, as is the case with dry commodities, they are drafted in 
a bipartisan way to accommodate the needs of traders who are both buyers and sellers. 
Standard form contracts act in practice as a form of private legislation. 
 
In the case of bespoke contracts,25 the principle of contractual certainty has been heavily 
compromised in recent years by a judicial willingness to penetrate the written language 
and find the true intent of the parties with the aid of a close examination of the contract 
background (or matrix of fact). English law does not as such espouse and label a so-
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called “clear-meaning” rule,26 but it has long had the reputation of a law that attaches 
fundamental importance to the written language of the contract. Recent developments 
have permitted courts to go behind the written screen to discover an ambiguity that would 
not be apparent on the face of the document alone. This development, far from being just 
a neutral attempt to discover the truth of the matter, has given rise to the danger of some 
courts imposing on contracting parties a reasonable contract and not necessarily the 
contract to which they committed themselves. This has happened broadly in two ways. 
First, once ambiguity has been discerned, courts have selected the meaning that accords 
with commercial common sense, which may be treated as a surrogate for the 
commercially reasonable solution.27 A later judicial reaction against this emphasises that 
the courts ought not to impose a reasonable contract on the parties.28 Secondly, in 
inferring implied terms in an incomplete contract, the processes of implication and 
interpretation have been said to be the same in that a court implying terms is only after all 
seeking out the meaning of the parties.29 This development has threatened a greater 
degree of judicial intervention in contracts than has proved acceptable in the past30 and 
for that reason has been the subject of a recent reaction.31 The law in the last few years 
has been moving back and forth like a pendulum but the augurs point to a reaction in 
favour of traditional values.32 What is noticeable, however, in this entire process is the 
absence of any reference to good faith. 
 
(f) current position in English law 
 
Until quite a short time ago, it might fairly have been said that any debate about the overt 
presence in English law of a general principle of good faith and fair dealing was starved 
of oxygen. The House of Lords had ruled in very strong terms that there was no role to be 
accorded to such a principle in the adversarial world of contract formation.33 This firm 
stance did not rule out good faith in the performance of contracts, but there was no relish 
for the adoption of such a principle in that area: the doctrine of fiduciary relations had in 
a sense occupied the field in its application to contracts that called for closely cooperative 
action, with one party reposing trust and confidence in the other. 
 
There are currently signs, nevertheless, of some disturbance in the force.34 There are two 
areas of activity that repay interest. First, there are cases where one party is invested with 
a discretion and the question arises whether an account must be taken of the interests of 
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the other party when that discretion comes to be exercised.35 Secondly, the practice is 
developing of parties inserting in their contracts a duty to negotiate or settle differences in 
good faith.36 In addition to these two developments, a particular judge has shown an 
inclination to countenance the imposition of a duty of good faith in the performance of 
contracts,37 though it is far from clear whether he has more than basic honesty in mind 
and there are few signs that his call possesses a general appeal38 outside the ranks of 
those academic lawyers who are waiting for a sign to lead them into the promised land of 
ethical contracting. Indeed, the Court of Appeal has recently drawn attention to the 
potentially baneful effects of a general principle of good faith: “[T]he better course is for 
the law to develop along established lines rather than to encourage judges to look for 
…some ‘general organising principle’ drawn from cases of disparate kinds…There is…a 
real danger that if a general principle of good faith were established it would be invoked 
as often to undermine as to support the terms in which the parties have reached 
agreement. The danger is not dissimilar to that posed by too liberal an approach to 
construction…”39 Contracting parties are always at liberty to subject themselves to a 
good faith standard, but this is not something that an English court will freely infer from 
a contract.40 
 
As for contractual discretion, the interesting aspect of this development lies in the 
connection that is made between the private contract law and administrative law. For 
nearly seventy years, there has been a principle of administrative law that the decisions of 
a public authority may be reviewed if they are decisions that no reasonable authority 
could have taken.41 This strikes at aberrant decisions and is by no means the same thing 
as requiring the authority to act reasonably; the language of good faith, moreover, is 
nowhere mentioned. Although the language of administrative law has been rejected in 
contract cases where one party is given a discretion to exercise under the contract, a 
similar principle is employed,42 though it has been firmly stressed that it has no part to 
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play when it comes to the exercise of “absolute contractual rights”.43 It should be noted 
that the courts have striven for exact language to capture the control that must be 
exercised in cases of this nature; they have not been content to throw a broad blanket of 
good faith over the contracts in question. It may be, too, that the preferences thus 
displayed by English courts express as much as anything the relations between a trial 
court and an appeal court. Too broad a test might be insufficiently indicative of what a 
trial court is doing and invite an appeal court to intervene more than its resources allow; a 
narrower and more precise test permits a sufficient degree of supervision leading to 
selective intervention. 
 
English courts have long shied away from imposing a duty on contracting parties to 
negotiate. In this regard, they have shown a commitment to freedom from contract to add 
to their long-standing commitment to freedom of contract. Even if no problems are posed 
by the doctrine of consideration, and even though courts have been willing to use implied 
terms to fill very substantial contractual gaps,44 they have stopped short in the past of 
enforcing so-called agreements to agree in the absence of criteria in the contract referring 
them to an objective standard of what the parties were seeking to achieve.45 The essential 
objections have been twofold. First, it is not for the courts to make the parties’ contract 
for them. Secondly, such an agreement is too uncertain to be enforced. That now sees to 
be changing in the light of developing contract practice making more use of such clauses, 
and similar clauses called for attempts to resolve disputes before formal steps are 
undertaken. A higher imperative than refraining from interference in the contractual 
process is giving effect so far as possible to what the parties have sought to do.46 
 
(g) the American position 
 
It is all very well to speak of the common law position on good faith, but what does this 
mean when it comes to the express recognition of good faith and fair dealing in the 
American Uniform Commercial Code47 and the Restatement Second of Contracts?48 One 
response is that the imperatives of legal development in the United States have led to the 
creation of a legal system that displays some of the features of the civil law. The US 
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Supreme Court in 1938 rejected the notion of a federal common law,49 with the result that 
few cases on private law, and fewer still on private contract law, are determined by that 
court. The creation of a uniform private law is in effect delegated to legislative and quasi-
legislative bodies such as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws and the American Law Institute. Rendering contract law into a legislative form – at 
least if the intricate techniques of the Whitehall parliamentary draftsman are not 
employed – naturally encourages a higher degree of abstraction. When the specific 
outcomes of cases decided by reference to the good faith standard, or considered so to 
have been, are analysed, they add nothing to what could have been achieved by using 
existing canons of contractual interpretation and implied terms.50 
 
3. Article 7(1) 
 
(a) not binding on the parties 
 
Article 7(1) calls for the interpretation of the CISG with regard being paid to “the 
observance of good faith in international trade”. This was a compromise reached after a 
number of common law countries objected to the imposition of a duty of good faith on 
the contracting parties themselves. In this regard, the CISG differs from other 
instruments, such as the Principles of European Contract Law and the Unidroit Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts, that expressly impose a duty of good faith on the 
contracting parties.51 Article 7(1) is expressed in the passive voice and does not indicate 
exactly who or what should be paying regard to good faith. Since, however, contracting 
parties make and perform contracts, and courts and tribunals interpret and enforce those 
contracts, the bearers of the duty can only be courts and arbitrators. Even so, that duty 
must be mediated through the States parties to the CISG. Despite this, the first English 
language version of a leading text on the CISG asserted that a duty on courts and 
tribunals was tantamount to a duty on the contracting parties themselves.52 At the risk of 
oversimplifying it, the argument ran in the following vein: “Parties derive their rights and 
duties from the contract in accordance with the CISG; the CISG is to be interpreted in 
accordance with good faith; therefore the parties’ rights and duties are subject to good 
faith.”53 
 
This argument of course begs the question. Suppose contracting parties wish to allow for 
the avoidance of a contract in the case of non-performance according to a test that is less 
demanding than the fundamental breach test in Article 25. Article 6 gives them the 
freedom to do this. On a falling market, the buyer declares avoidance of the contract, as 
                                                 
49
 Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins 304 US 64 (1938). 
50
 An exercise I carried out some years ago: MG Bridge, “Does Anglo-Canadian Law Need a Doctrine of 
Good Faith?” (1984) 9 Can Bus LJ 385. The answer to the question in the title was no. 
51
 According to Art 1.7(1) of the Unidroit Principles: “Each party must act in accordance with good faith 
and fair dealing in international trade.” 
52
 P Schlechtriem and I Schwenzer (eds), Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG) (Oxford, 1st edn, 1998), p 63 (Schlechtriem). Subsequent editions of this text have made it 
clear that Art 7(1) does not sanction the imposition of a duty of good faith on the contracting parties 
themselves. 
53
 MG Bridge, The International Sale of Goods (Oxford, 3rd edn, 2014), para 10.41. 
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the contract expressly permits. The seller, invoking the principle of good faith, now 
complains that the buyer would not have done this if the market had been steady or if it 
had risen. As the seller might say, the buyer is not abiding by the spirit of an agreement 
that, in a dynamic market, was designed to allocate market risk between the parties. If 
good faith is to have any meaning, then it must have a role to play in a case of this kind. 
Yet, to say that the parties’ choice of a lower standard of non-performance is subject to 
the requirements of good faith is to assume that good faith is embedded as a restriction on 
the freedom granted to them by Article 6. 
 
(b) must there be prima facia ambiguity? 
 
If we take instead good faith as a principle of interpretation to be applied by courts and 
tribunals, then what does this mean and when does it come into play? The issue we are 
now squarely facing is that of fidelity to the written text. Do the words of the CISG have 
a meaning that imposes itself upon the court or tribunal, or do they simply act as a point 
of departure to a forum that draws its inspiration from them? It is well known that Justice 
Scalia of the US Supreme Court was a so-called “originalist”, who resisted dynamic 
interpretations of the Constitution to give the Constitution meaning and effect in cases 
that the founding fathers either did not or could not have had in mind. This of course is a 
serious matter for an instrument that is over 200 years old and one that is calculated to 
divide a court, some of whose members see the Constitution as a living and evolving 
organism and some of whom see it as holy writ that, if it is to be changed, should so be 
done by the proper legislative procedure. Given the difficulty of effecting constitutional 
change, originalism is a profoundly conservative doctrine. 
 
The CISG, which came into force in 1988, has been subjected to calls for dynamic 
interpretation.54 It has also been claimed that Article 7(1) should on this basis be 
interpreted as giving rise to a duty of good faith on the contracting parties themselves.55 
The argument ignores the legislative record of the CISG,56 accelerates the history of the 
CISG and, in its disregard of the wording of the CISG, is seriously at odds with the rule 
of law. It is all very well to turn to good faith to clarify an ambiguous text, but a 
provision of the CISG that is clear on its face does not merit such unwarranted 
interference. How are contracting parties to plan for the future and assess risk if their 
efforts are to be subjected to an occult, broad standard that has never been subjected to a 
rigorous definition or, so far as I can see, any real attempt to answer hard questions? In 
what sense are they trusting their fate to the law if there is no predictability in its 
application? Lord Mansfield’s words on commercial certainty, quoted above, reimpose 
themselves at this point. 
 
(c) interpretation and the rule of law  
 
                                                 
54
 For discussions of dynamic interpretation, see A Janssen and O Meyer (eds), CISG Methodology (Sellier, 
2009) (essays by Magnus, Eiselen and Gruber). 
55
 S Kröll, L Mistelis and M del P Perales Viscasillas (eds), The United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2011), p 121 (M del P Perales Viscasillas). 
56
 See below. 
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On the issue of the rule of law and departure from the written text of the CISG, it is worth 
looking at two examples that do not explicitly invoke good faith but that might fairly be 
said to be representative cases of dynamic interpretation. The first of these examples is 
the decision of the Belgian Cour de cassation57 in which the court invented a rule that 
contracts could be revised to the advantage of a contracting party claiming that 
supervening hardship had altered the basis of the contract. In the case of supervening 
events that create an impediment to the performance of the contract, the CISG contains a 
provision that exempts the non-performing party from liability in damages and to that 
extent sanctions a degree of withdrawal from contractual responsibility.58 It does not have 
a rule dealing with hardship that, by increasing the responsibilities of the other party 
under a revised contract, does the very opposite of sanctioning withdrawal by a non-
performing party. In contrast, the Unidroit Principles have extensive provisions expressly 
permitting revision of the contract in cases of hardship59 but a similar proposal, though 
considered, was not adopted in the text of the CISG.60 The Belgian case concerned the 
cost of raw materials required by the seller who, so far as I can see, might have protected 
itself by first obtaining a binding contract to supply materials at a stated price or by 
entering into a hedging transaction. As for whether the Cour de cassation was actuated by 
notions of good faith, we may never know. The spare style of the court’s judgment gives 
us less to go on than a palaeontologist with a few bones has when imagining a newly 
discovered species of dinosaur. 
 
The second example concerns decisions on fundamental breach. The test for a 
fundamental breach in Article 25 of the CISG is concerned exclusively with the effects of 
a breach. It is solely driven by the factual consequences of the particular breach. Unlike 
the Unidroit Principles,61 Article 25 does not sanction an inquiry into additional factors, 
such as the importance of a particular term in the trade. Indeed, a clear provision in the 
Hague Law of 1964 (ULIS) that failure to deliver on time in the case of market-quoted 
goods gave rise to a right of avoidance was not adopted.62 It is always open to contracting 
parties to opt out of the fundamental breach rule,63 but this was not used as the basis of 
certain German decisions that have sought to accommodate the importance of time and 
documents in certain areas of international sale.64 As exercises in commercial reality, the 
                                                 
57
 Cour de cassation (Belgium) 19 June 2009, CISG-Online 1963 (Pace). 
58
 Art 79. 
59
 Arts 6.2.1-3. 
60
 See the peremptory rejection of a hardship provision in the 1977 draft by the Committee of the Whole: 
A/32/17, Annex 1 paras 458-60. Despite this rejection, see the assertion of the CISG Advisory Council, 
Opinion No 7, that hardship can be brought in under Art 79. 
61
 Art 7.3.1. 
62
 Art 28 (ULIS): “Failure to deliver the goods at the date fixed shall amount to a fundamental breach of the 
contract whenever a price for such goods is quoted on a market where the buyer can obtain them.” 
Similarly, consider this passage from the UN Secretariat Commentary on the 1978 draft (Art 45): “The rule 
that the buyer can normally avoid the contract only if there has been a fundamental breach of contract is not 
in accord with the typical practice under CIF and other documentary sales. Since there is a general rule that 
the documents presented by the seller in a documentary transaction must be in strict compliance with the 
contract, buyers have often been able to refuse the documents if there has been some discrepancy.” 
63
 Art 6. 
64
 See BGH 3 April 1996, CISG-Online 135 (Pace), asserting that the fundamental character of a breach 
can be derived from the contract itself. See also OLG Hamburg 28 February 1997, CISG-Online 261 
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decisions in themselves are perfectly sensible and, had the CISG been responsive to the 
concerns they evidence about the suitability of the text of commodities dealings, would 
have made it a more attractive instrument for commodities traders. But these decisions 
pay no respect to the wording of the CISG. A legal instrument that blows in the 
discretionary winds cannot provide the uniformity and certainty that prompted the quest 
for legal uniformity. 
 
(d) appearance in the case law 
 
The question now is how Article 7(1) has been handled in the case law. German, Dutch 
and Spanish courts have held that it is against good faith for a court to give effect to a 
jurisdiction clause on the back of a contractual document when a contracting party would 
not expect to see it there.65 What has that to do with good faith? If one party wishes the 
other to agree to a jurisdiction clause, then the proper approach is to ensure that both 
parties consent to it, which turns upon due notice being given of the existence of the 
clause.66 In the absence of such notice, how can there be any consent? Contract is the 
product of consenting parties and is not the result of a unilateral imposition of the will of 
one party on another. A contracting party who has not been sufficiently informed of a 
clause cannot be said to have agreed to it. A French court appears to have used Article 
7(1) as a justification for requiring a buyer to pay damages for abuse of the legal process 
arising out of the way it conducted litigation based on a meritless claim.67 How this 
outcome is to be integrated into the interpretation of the Convention is a complete 
mystery. There are various ways in which abusive litigation can be dealt with, for 
example by means of a costs order, but an award of damages on the basis of Article 7(1) 
does not come close to providing a justification for the award. In a way that is hard to 
understand, a German court dispensed with the need for a declaration of avoidance to be 
made to a seller who had clearly renounced the contract, though Article 26 
unambiguously calls for notice and leaves on its face no room for exceptions.68 Article 
7(1) was said by the court not to open up the CISG to interpretation in the light of every 
single equitable consideration, but it did pave the way for taking into account concretised 
examples of good faith in national legal systems. Even if sense can be made of that 
assertion for an instrument that is supposed to stand above national law, it is still hard to 
know how good faith comes into play. There are other ways of saying that the seller 
might not take the arid, technical point that it had not received a declaration of avoidance. 
A declaration can surely be made by informal means and it certainly can be implied from 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Pace); OLG Düsseldorf 24 April 1997, CISG-Online 385 (Pace). The stance adopted by these courts 
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(1989), 521. 
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 See OLG Celle 24 July 2009, CISG-Online 1906 (Pace); LG Neubrandenburg 3 August 2005, CISG-
Online 1190 (Pace); BGH 31 October 2001, CISG-Online 617 (Pace); OLG München 14 January 2009; Rb 
Rotterdam 25 February 2009; Audiencia Provincial de Navarra 27 December 2007 (Pace). 
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conduct. Apart from these cases, there is little to remark in the judicial treatment of good 
faith in Article 7(1). 
 
4. Article 7(2) 
 
(a) the legislative history 
 
The Working Group on the occasion of its ninth meeting observed that the majority of 
national representatives supported the inclusion in the CISG of a general concept of good 
faith and fair dealing, which had proved to be a useful regulator of conduct in some legal 
systems.69 Contrasting views were expressed on whether this would aid uniformity in 
practice or would require substantial judicial interpretation over time to become 
effective.70 There was, nevertheless, considerable opposition to the above text that was 
proposed by Hungary.71 
 
Further on in the legislative process, it became clear that opinion amongst the national 
representatives was quite sharply divided. Against good faith were those who wanted to 
know how a moral imperative could be applied to particular transactions and who thought 
that judges would resort to their own legal and social traditions at the expense of 
uniformity. It was also said to be unnecessary to spell out good faith in the CISG since it 
was implicit in all business laws. Furthermore, the sanction for breaching good faith was 
not stipulated so that the matter would have to be remitted to national laws as a validity 
issue72 at the expense of uniformity. In support of good faith were those who saw good 
faith as a universal norm and who saw its omission as an act of opposition to good faith, a 
particularly serious matter given the need for good faith in trading relations with 
developing countries and for content to be given to the development of a new 
international economic order. This theme also surfaced in the discontent some supporters 
of good faith expressed about the reference to fair dealing. In an argument that makes no 
more sense now than it did then, they thought that fair dealing was too close to 
established international business practices, which in respect of developing countries 
could not be said to be fair, to be acceptable. Fair dealing therefore meant unfair dealing. 
It should, they said, be replaced by a reference to international cooperation. A 
compromise solution, that good faith be built into the interpretation of the CISG and not 
imposed on the parties, was floated and the matter remitted to a working group of six 
countries, which proposed a text very close to the current Article 7(1). This was accepted 
by the Commission.73 Attempts were made at the diplomatic conference in Vienna to 
translate good faith in interpreting the CISG to good faith in interpreting the contract of 
sale74 but there was insufficient support for this proposal.75 
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(b) can we infer good faith as a general principle? 
 
An express provision requiring good faith and fair dealing to be a norm binding on the 
contracting parties was therefore rejected in the legislative process, but Article 7(2) called 
for a reference to the general principles on which the CISG was based when it came to 
matters that were dealt with in the CISG but not expressly settled by it. The question is 
whether this formula opens the door to those who see good faith as an existing, universal 
norm.76 Two lines of inquiry suggest themselves. First, how far can we say that good 
faith has been recognised as a general principle underlying the CISG? Secondly, a harder 
question, are there unresolved matters that can be settled by invoking good faith? 
 
On the first question, the Secretariat Commentary on the 1978 draft identified a number 
of provisions as expressive of the principle of good faith. These were provisions 
concerning irrevocable offers, late acceptances, informal contractual modification, cure 
of defective goods, exclusion of notice of defect, loss of the right to declare a contract 
avoided, and the duty to preserve goods.77 This is very much a mixed bag of provisions 
that can be grouped under the heading of good faith only if good faith is given the 
broadest possible meaning. The only surprise is that the Secretariat Commentary did not 
add to the mix a number of other provisions that might with equal justification be said to 
encompass such a broad and meaningless notion of good faith. For example, room could 
just as well have been made for provisions dealing with interpretation, discrepancies 
between offer and acceptance, fundamental breach, notice of defect, requiring repair, 
providing specifications, suspension of performance, anticipatory fundamental breach 
and adequate assurance, mitigation of loss, and non-responsibility for the other party’s 
failure to perform.78 The problem with a concept that explains everything is that it 
explains nothing. Good faith can explain why contracts should be performed (pacta sunt 
servanda), but it can equally justify why they should not be performed (eg, exemption). If 
it is to serve any purpose at all, good faith must serve more than the taxonomic purpose 
of grouping and classifying provisions of a text; it must also guide conduct and have a 
predictive value. 
 
Turning now to the case law on good faith in Article 7(2),79 what does it tell us? The 
rewards of examining the case law are very slender. Good faith may be thrown into the 
mix for no explained reason.80 The last thing one sees in the case law is a systematic 
examination of the CISG to derive therefrom a principle of good faith that is needed to 
dispose of a problem for which the CISG makes no provision. We see that good faith 
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explains the principle of estoppel (or non venire contra factum proprium).81 Does this 
estoppel principle, which must be or come close to being a universally accepted principle, 
need to be explained in this way? Again, does good faith need to be employed when 
principles of interpretation in Article 8 apply?82 What has good faith to do with 
calculating a claimant’s rate of interest?83 Does good faith, rather than the quality 
provisions of Article 35, require that flour be of an international standard?84 Is there a 
need to resort to good faith when a sales order has been consensually annulled yet the 
seller later demands that the buyer perform?85 Good faith bulks larger when the matter 
concerns the exercise of a right or remedy. A court in one case held that a seller was not 
acting in good faith when it launched proceedings for the price of goods shortly after the 
due date without giving the buyer a chance to explain.86 National rules of civil procedure, 
staying proceedings or imposing costs orders, are usually apt to deal with this kind of 
thing. Standing back from the cases, one is driven to the following conclusion: looking 
for a substantial and meaningful manifestation of good faith in the case law of the CISG 




My conclusion is a brief one. Those fearful of the disruptive effect of good faith should 
perhaps stop worrying. It has played only a small part in the case law, has not shown in 
practice any meaningful content, and does not appear to have been invoked in a 
destructive way. They may, however, be concerned about the lack of rigour in judicial 
reasoning that resorts to such a concept and deplore a certain intellectual laziness in such 
reasoning. Those who support the existence of a role for good faith may be content to see 
the flag being flown, though if they have ambitions for a more ethical contract law there 
is little evidence to show that good faith is taking the law further in that direction. Above 
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